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TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF Cert to CAS 
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS ~ c ;1- s-(J:;:;.:::J, jje'C__ $-
BURD:~E (5.j-.:;l_,.~~) ~ F-:fer~ivil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Respondent, a state agency, alleges conflicts in the 
,...-- . ----
circuits _5!;!._er (1) the burden of proving in Title VII suits that an 
employer had a non-discriminatory reason for dismissing a plaintiff who --·- - - ________.,. __________________ _ 
has proven a prima facie case of discrimination, and (2) the proper 
standard for appellate review of a district court's finding of no 
( 
- 2 -
(2) Respondent, a woman, was employed as a "field services 
coorindator" by the Public Service Careers Division (PSC) of the Texas 
Department of Community Affairs (TDCA). In 1972, respondent's immediate 
supervisor, a "project director" resigned. The head of PSC did not 
appoint a new project director, however, and instead divided the job's 
responsiblities among several persons including respondent. In 1973, the 
United States Department of Labor (DOL), which provided all funds for 
PSC, threatened to terminate those funds unless certain inadequacies in 
staffing and organization were corrected. The head of PSC at that time, 
one B. R. Fuller, brought an outsider, Robert Watts, in to fill the 
position of project director. Fuller also promoted one Robert Walz from 
his position as a subordinate to respondent to the newly created position 
of project coordinator. Finally, Fuller dismissed respondent. 
Respondent filed suit in federal court, alleging that she had been 
the victim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. She alleged 
three different incidents of discrimination: (1) The hiring of Watts 
rather than her to fill the position of project director; (2) the 
promotion of Walz to project coordinator and her concurrent dismissal, 
and (3) a denial of pay equal to that received by male project directors 
who performed duties similar to hers between 1972 and 1973. The district 
court {Roberts, w. D. Tex.) entered judgment for petitioner, finding "no 
basis upon which to hold that [respondent] has been discriminated against 
because of her sex. " 
As relevant to the present petition, the CA 5 reversed the district 
court's entry of judgment against respondent on her claim that the 
promotion of Walz and her concurrent dismissal violated Title VII. 
First, the CA5 looked to this Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas CoU2. 
v. Green, 411 u.s. 792 {1973) and concluded that respondent had made out 
( 
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a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII because she had 
shown that (1) she belongs to a group (i.e., females) protected by the 
statute, (2) she applied for and was was qualified for the job eventually 
given to Walz, (3) she was rejected for that position despite her 
qualifications, and (4) Fuller eventually filled the position with a 
person having similar or even lesser qualifications than respondent. 
Given such a prima-facie case, the CAS noted that McDonnell Douglas 
placed the burden on petitioner "to articulate some legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for" responde~t's rejection. 411 U.S. at 802. 
According to the CAS, an employer does not satisfy this burden unless it 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence th~t it acted for a 
non-discriminatory reason. Here, the CAS on review of the evidence found 
-----------
that the only reason "articulated" by Fuller for elevating Walz over 
respondent was Fuller's subjective and apparantly uncorroborated opinion 
that petitioner had trouble dealing with her co-workers. While conceding 
that Walz was "qualified" for the job of project coordinator, the CAS 
. -
felt that respondent was equally qualified and held that petitioner's 
showing was insufficient to overcome petitioner's prima facie case of 
discrimination. 
t 
The CAS also rejected petitioner's contention that it was bound to 
phold the district court's finding of non-discrimination unless the 
ppellate court believed that holding to be "clearly erroneous." The CAS 
admitted that it was bound by the trial court's findings of "evidentiary 
facts" unless they were clearly erroneous, but refused to apply that 
standard of review to the district court's finding of non-discrimination 
because that finding, while technically a finding of fact, was "the 
ultimate issue for resolution in a Title VII case." The CAS therefore 
made an independent determination of the merits of respondent's 




3. CONTEN'riONS: (A) Petitioners assert that, by requiring an 
employer to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the personnel action was taken for 
non-discriminatory reasons, the CAS misinterpreted this Court's mandate 
~ ~
in McDonnell Douglas and created a conflict with the CAl. In McDonnell 
Douglas, the Court spoke in terms of "articulat[ing]" a legitimate 
-
nondiscrimatory reason for the employee's rejection. According to 
petitioners, by interpreting "articulate" to mean "prove by a - ~ ------. 
preponderance of the evidence" the CAS has imposed upon the employer th e - ----------
burden of disproving discriminatory intent, a result contrary to· this . . 
Court's specific holding in Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 u.s. 24 
(1978). Furthermore, petitioner quotes Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 
1003, 1011 (CAl 1979), where the CAl stated: 
We think it now clear that McDonnell Douglas 
leaves the burden of persuasion at all times with 
the plaintiff, and that the employer's burden to 
a "articulate 11 a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason is not a burden to persuade the trier that 
he was in fact motivated by that reason and not 
by a discriminatory one. Rather it is a burden 
of production -- i.e., a burden to articulate or 
state a valid reason, following which the 
complainant must show that the reasons so 
articulated or stated is a mere pretext or 
11 Cover-up 11 for what was in truth a discriminatory 
purpose. (emphasis in original). 
Respondent replies that the CAS correctly interpreted McDonnell 
Douglas. According to respondent, were an employer permitted to rebut a 
prima facie case of discrimination merely by advancing a plausible, 
non-discriminatory reason for the action, the burden on the employer 
would be light indeed. Respondent also believes that the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the personnel action wa E 
- s -
taken for non-discriminatory reasons is not the same as a burden of 
proving the absense of discrimintory intent as discussed in Sweeney. 
Respondent does not discuss the alleged conflict with Loeb. 
{B) Petitioner asserts that the standard of review applied by the 
CAS to the district court's finding of no discrimination conflicts with 
the standard of review employed in the ~Al. According to petitioner, CA1 
will uphold a district court's finding on the issue of discrimination 
unless that finding is clearly erroneous. See Sweeney v. Board of 
Trustees~ 604 F.2d 106 {CAl 1979), cert. denied u.s. {1980). 
Respondent concedes that the CAl applies a different standard of 
appellate review than that employed in the present case. Nevertheless, 
respondent asserts that, even under the Sweeney standard, petitioner 
failed to present sufficient support for the district court's finding of 
~ non-discrimination. 
4. DISCUSSION: There would seem to be direct conflicts between the 
CAS and CAl on both of the issues raised by petitioner. Furthermore, 
~
although it is possible that the CAS might have reached the same 
conclusion had it employed the CAl's standards, the CAS carefully stated 
the standards it was applying and gave no indication that it would have 
reversed under less rigorous standards. The questions presented in this 
petition would seem to be of some importance, but conceivably could 
benefit from consideration by other CA's prior to intervention by this 
Court. 
There is a response and a supplement to the petition. 
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Question Presented 
Must an employer in a Title VII case prove by a 
preponderence of the evidence that a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason supports its employment decision, in 
order to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case? 
I 
This case arises from this Court's, and the lower 
courts', continuing difficulty in defining with precision the 
evidentiary burden an employer bears in a Title VII case. The 
tripartite shifting··· of burdens was first set out in <anonnell ... --
Douglas Corp.· v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the 
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 
The elements of the prima facie case are familiar and are not 
in dispute in this case. Furnco Constr. Co v. Walters, 438 u.s. 
567, 577-78 (1978) elaborated the purpose of the prima facie 
case: it "raises an inference of racial discrimination only 
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are 
more likly than not based on the consideration of impermissible 
factors." 
The question in this case is what the employer must 
th h(0t~ ~~~f - ~f d' ' ' t' M 11 en s ow o re 1s 1n erence o 1Scr1m1na 1on. cDonne 
1\ 
Douglas stated that the employer must "articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's 
rejection." 411 U.S. at 802. Furnco stated that the employer's 
burden " is merely that of proving that he based his employment 
decision on a legitimate consideration, and not on an 
illigitmate one such as race." 438 U.S. at 578. The slight~ 
difference in language between thse two formulation has bred 
considerable confusion and led to lower courts imposing 
markedly different burdens on the employer. 
Before addressing this ambiguity more particularly it 
is helpful to explain what burden the Court has said will shift 
to the plaintiff if the employer satisfies his burden. In 
McDonnel Douglas, the Court stated that the plaintiff must have 
an opportunity to prove "that petitioner's stated reason for 
resp's rejection was in fact pretext." 411 U.S. at 804. Later, 
it was stated: "In short, on the retrial resp must be given a 
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence 
that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in 
fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." Id. at 
805. Furnco described the plaintiff's burden at this stage in 
much the same terms: "The plaintiff must be given the 
opportunity to introduce evidence that the prof feed 
justification is merely a pretext for discrimination." 438 u.s. 
at 578. In short, the cases indicate that the plaintiff's 
burden here is to show that the employer's stated, neutral ~ 
reason for the employment decision was not the employer's true 
reason 
Clarification of the employer's burden to rebut the 
prima facie case was offered in Board of Trustees of Keene 
State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). There CAl had 
described the employer's burden in the approved manner, but 
also had stated that, "in requiring the defendant to prove 
absence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme Court has placed 
the burden squarely on the party with the greater access to 
such evidence." 569 F.2d at 177. The Court flatly rejected this 
description and reaffirmed that the employer's burden was only 
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Although 
four Jus tics dissented from the summary vacation of the CA' s 
decision, apparently disagreeing as to the characteriazation of 
what the CA and the propriety of summary 
consideration 
done' or 'produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory 
........____ --- --- --....... ____.... ------
reasons.'" 439 u.s. at 25 n.2, quoting dissent at 28, 29. The 
dissent had attempted to reconcile the different formulations 
of McDonnell Douglas and Furnco by stating that the only way a 
defendant can "articulate" reasons is by testimony, "thereby 
proving these reasons." Id. at 29. The dissent clearly stated 
that the only burden on the defendant is a burden of 
production; the burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff 
at all times. Id. The majority appears to have fully agreed 
with this characteriazation. 
Following Sweeney, most CA's have held that the 
employer has only a burden of production: taking the stand and 
stating a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. 
Two cases so holding are worthy of note. In Loeb v. Textron, 
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1979), CAl (Campbell, J.) formulated the 
burden in light of the remand of its decision in Sweeney. The 
court held, "We think it now clear that McDonnell Douglas 
leaves the burden of persuasion at all times with the 
plaintiff, and that the employer's burden to "articulate" a 
nondiscriminatory reason is not a burden to persuade the trier 
of fact that he was in fact motivated by that reason and not by 
a discriminatory one." Id. at 1011. The court believed that 
this understanding was most consistent with the burden that 
would then shiftto the plaintiff. "To say, as the court did 
here, that the defendant must prove that its action was based 
on a legitimate reason and that the plaintiff must "then" prove 
that it was not, is contradictory." Id. at 1012. The court also 
atated that it would require the employer to state with 
particularity the reasons for the dismissal in order to satisfy 
the burden of production. 
/ 
CA2 came to much the same conclusion in Lieberman v. 
Gant, 23 FEP Cases 505 ( 1980) (Friendly, J.) • After reviewing -
the decisions of this Court leading up to Sweeney, the court 
stated: 
f 
"It is thus enough for the defendan~ in the 
second phase of the case to ~!Dg forth evide~ce 
tha he acted on a neutral bas is.- They do not 
have the our en o es a l1s 1ng at the basis 
was sound; rather the burden then falls on the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that it is pretextual. 
One way of doing this, of course, would be to 
show that the asserted neutral basis was so 
ridden with error that defendant could not 
honestly have relied upon it." Id. at 509. 
In other words, if the employer claims that the plaintiff was 
discharged becaue she was incompetent, the employer does not 
need to prove that the plaintiff was in fact incompetent either 
absolutely or relative to other candidates. This would appear 
to be so because the employer may be mistaken in its belief 
that the plaintiff is incompetent but not be guilty of 
discrimination. The plaintiff can make hay from such a mistake 
only if she can show that the charge of incompetence is so 
baseless that it seems pretextual. CAl in Loeb seemes to agree 
with this; it stated that "While the employer's judgment or 
course of action may seem poor to outsiders, the relevant 
question is simply whether the given reason was a pretext for 
illegal discrimination." 600 F.2d at 1012 n.6. CA2 referred to 
the instant CAS case in passing and suggested that it was 
flatly wrong. 23 FEP Cases at n. 7. 
These two cases agree that employer's burden is one 
of production only. It is important to note that they read this 
··' 
rule as discharging the employer from proving two distinct 
facts. , he need not prove that he actually was motivated 
by the This point is sound; it is compelled by 
Sweeney's command that the employer need not prove absence of 
discriminatory motive, and by the remaining burden on the 
plaintiff of proving pretext.~ the two cases seem also 
to hold that the employer need not prove any factual base for 
its neutral reason, that is it need not prove that the 
plaintiff, in fact, engaged in unlawful conduct, McDonnell 
Douglas, that the employer never hired "at the gate", Furnco, 
or that more qualififed candidates were available. While this 
rule follws logically from the premise that the employer has 
only a burden of production, it places a significant burden on 
the plaintiff that may be difficult to overcome. This will be 
discussed further, infra. 
II 
Resp, a female, was employed by petr as a Field 
Services Coordinator. Her superior, the Project Director, 
resigned, and petr applied for his job. Petr hired someone from 
a different divsion to take this job. At the command of the 
Dep't of Labor, which provided all the funding for the division 
of petr within which resp worked, petr reorganized the division 
and reduced the staff. Resp was discharged. Resp brought suit 
in the DC alleging, inter alia, that the failure to promote and 
the subsequent discharge were both prompted by gender 
discrimination. The DC held for petr, finding that neither acts 
had been motivated by gender prejudice. The DC's judgment was 
general and did not refer to the shifting burdens of proof. 
The CA reversed in part. It affirmed as to the 
failure to promote or~~ ground that the male hired in place 
of resp was more qualified. It reversed as to the discharge of 
~ 
resp. The CA held that resp ahd made out a prima facie case. It 
A 
discussed the burden then on the employer. 
"Defendant may refute plaintiff's prima 
facie case by articulating a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection. 
1 
... This court requires defendant to prove 
nondiscriminatory reasons by a preponderence of 
the evidence. Turner v. Texas Instruments, 55 
F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977). This holding is 
not inconsistent with [Sweeney], which merely 
stated that the defendant is not required to 
prove absence of discriminatory motive. Our 
holding in Turner simply states the obvious: 
"articulating" a legitimate reason involves more 
than simply stating ficticious reasons: legally 
sufficient proof is needed before the trier of 
fact can find plaintiff's proof rebutted." 
(emphasis in original). 
CAS adds an additional element to the defendant's rebuttal: he 
must show that that the person hired, promoted, or retained was 
in some objective sense better than the plaintiff. East v. 
Roamine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975). 
Applying thses standards to the facts, the CA held 
that the employer had not sustained its burden of proving a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by a preponderence of the 
evidence. Petr's officer had testified that resp had had 
friction with other membes of the staff, and that the person 
retained, formerly resp' s subordinate, was qualified and had 
been suggested by the staff. CAS found this insufficient 
because failed to introduce any objective data to show that the 
person retained had good relations with the staff or was more 
qualified. 
Petr 's argument that CAS erred essentially repeats 
the holding of Sweeney, as in terptreted by CAl in Loeb, that 
the employer has merely a burden of production which is met 
when the employer takes the stand and states a legitimate 
reason for the discharge. Resp agues that satisfying a burden 
of production involves introducing a factual base to support 
the bald assertion of why the plaintiff was terminated. The 
employer should have been required to show by objective data 
that plaintiff was in fact a troublemaker and that the person 
retained in her place was not. She argues that the employer 
should not be able to discharge his burden merely by stating 
ficticious reasons. 
CAS's insistence that it was not forcing the employer 
to prove the absence of discriminatory motive suggests that it 
did not wish to force the employer to prove that it actually 
fired resp because she couldn't get along. This conclusion is 
far from clear, but the opinion nowhere explicitly holds that 
petr lost because the court believed resp was fired for a 
different reaon. If this assessment is correct, the case 
squarely presents the question of what evidence an employer 
must introduce to discharge its burden of production. CAS 
speaks of the employer having a burden of persuasion, but this 
burden is limi fa to showing that a legitimate reason for the 
1\ 
discharge existed, not that the plaintiff was discharged for 
that reason. In other words, CAS holds that the defendant's 
burden of producing a legitimate reason is satisfied, only if 
the the employer carries the burden of persuading the trier of 
fact that a legitimate reason exists. The policy said to 
support this rule is that an employer should not be deemed to 
have rebutted the inference of discrimination raised by the 
plaintiff's prima facie case, merely by presenting f ictic ious 
reasons for the discharge. 
In my view CAS's rule is inconsistent with the 
Court's precedents and must be rejected; however, in rejecting ~ 
the rule the Court should be sensitive to the problem which led 
the CA to adopt it. Sweeney seems to hold that the burden of 
persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Under CAS's 
rule the employer bears the burden of persuasion to establish 
the existance of a legitimate reason for the discharge. During 
this time, the employer is also bearing the burden of 
persuasion on the ultimate issue in the case; if the employer 
does not persuade the trier of fact that legitimate reasons 
existed, it also fails to persuade that plaintiff was not 
discriminated against. Thus, although CAS does not conflict 
with the holding of Sweeney, as it noted, it does conflict with 
the rationale of that case. 
CAS's rule is also suspect on policy grounds. It 
constrains the discretion of the employer, as this case 
illustrates. Title VII does not require the employer to hire 
only the candidate who is superior accoraing to objective data 




prescribes making employment decisions on a discriminatory 
basis. CAS would require employers to "test" candidates, and 
would hold them liable if they could not convince the trier of 
fact that the decision was correct. Indeed, under East, they 
would have to demonstrate that the person chosen was 
objectively superior. This approaches being a substantive 
prophylactic rule. As Loeb states: 
"The employer's stated legitimate reason must be 
reasonably articulated and nondiscriminatory, 
but does not have to be a reason that the judge 
or jurors would act on or adopt. Nor is an 
employer required to adopt the policy that will 
maximise the number of minorities, women, or 
older persons in his workforce. [Furnco] An 
employer is entitled to mke his own policy and 
business judgments, and may, for example, fire 
an adequate employee if his reason is to hire 
one who will be even better, as long as this is 
not a pretext for discrimination." 600 F.2d at 
1012, n. 6. 
If the employer must persuade the trier of fact that his reason 
for an employment action is legitimate, there will be an 
invitation to second-guess his business judgment. 
Moreover, CAS's rule returns through the back door a 
burden on th~ em~{r to prove absence of discriminatory 
~--------
motive. If the concern is that the stated reason for the 
employment action not be ficticious, there is a suggestion that 
the employer must demonstrate that the reason is true. If the 
employer demonstrates that the proffered reason is why he in 
fact rejected the plaintiff, he is simultaneously proving that 
he acted without discriminatory intent. 
Although I believe that the Court should reject any 
burden of persuasion for the defendant, and specifically reject 
---------------------------------------
._ 
the East rule that the employer must demonstrete that the 
person hired was superior, the Court should also be sensitive 
to the difficulties at which CAS's rule is aimed. The 
defendant should not be deemed to satisfy its burden of 
production unless it has stated its legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons with sufficient clarity to allow the 
plaintiff to prove that they are a pretext. The plaintiff 
should not be buried in an avalanche of vague, cumulative 
statements nearly impossible to rebut. Also, the Court should 
make plain that the employer must state the actual reasons for 
the rejection, not neutral, but ficticious reaons. This will 
not be a significnt burden for the employer if he need not 
JJ 
prove that he was motvated by these reason. This burden on the 
employer may be sufficient to foster fair proceedings, because, 
"[t]he more idiosyncratic or questionable the employer's 
reason, the easier it will be to expose it as a pretext, if 
indeed it is one." Loeb, supra, 600 F. 2d at 1012 n. 6. The -
uncertainties of litigation will spur employers ~ fully 
explicate their reasons to give them credibility in the final 
....... - ---weighing. If the plaintiff can show that the reason is 
suspicious, she will have gone a long way toward showing that 
she has been a victim of discrimination. On the facts of this 
very case, a reasonable DC might find that resp has carried her 
burden of showing that the employer's reason for the rejection 
was pretext. See Sweeney v. Borad of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106 
(1st Cir. 1979) (DC's holding after remand that plaintiff proved 
' ,, . t 
discrimination not clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 
733 (1980). 
IQ:_ summary, I would reverse the CA' s decision that 
petr had to carry a burden of persuading the trier of fact that 
legitimate reasons for resp's rejection existed in fact. I 
would hold that the employer has only a burden of production. I 
would, however, attempt to describe this burden of production 
in such a way that the plaintiff will have a "full and fair" 
opportunity to demonstrate that it is a pretext. 
The other issues raised by the parties should not be 
decided. Petr asks whether the clearly erroneous rule applies 
to the DC's ultimate finding that there has or has not been 
discrimination. If the Court finds that the CA applied the 
wrong standard to the case, there is no occassion to reach this 
issue. I note, however, that the app licibility of the clearly 
erroneous rule to ultimate questions of mixed law and fact is a 
difficult question upon which the circuits are split and which 
this Court must someday address. Resp asks the Court to 
~alance the evidence under the proper legal standard and find 
that she has been the victim of discrimination. This is more 
properly the function of the CA. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79,-:1764 
!fex~ts pepaftmen~ of Communi~yj On Writ of Certiorari to 
Affp.P'!!1 Pe~ipionez:, ~he United States Court 
v~ of Appeals fqr the Fifth 
Joyce f'\qn :ijur:dine. Circuip. 
[Januar.y -, 1981] 
JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address again the nature of the 
flVidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an em-
ployment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. Thenar, 
row question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has 
made out a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a 
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscrimina, 
tory reason~ for the challenged employment action ~xisted. 
I 
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs 
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for 
the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers 
Division (PSC) . PSC provided training and employment 
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers. 
When hired . respondent possessed several years' experience in 
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services 
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in No-
vember of that year, and respondent was assigned additional 
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of 
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months. 
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depar-t-
7g_.I764-0PINION 
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned 
about inefficiencies at PSC.1 In February, 1973, the Depart-
ment notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller, 
that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA 
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to 
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC re-
forming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were 
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a com-
plete reorganization of the PSC sta:ff.2 
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, FulJer hired 
a male from another division of the agency as Project Direc-
tor. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired respondent along 
with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as 
the only professional employee in the division. It is undis-
puted that respondent had maintained her application for the 
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with 
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and as-
signed to another division of the agency. She received the 
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the sub-
sequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and 
responsibility commensurate with what she would have re-
ceived had she been appointed Project Director. 
Respondent filed this suit in the United States Distr'ct 
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that 
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to ter-
minate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court 
held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. 
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the em1Jlov-
ment decisions necePsitated by the commands of the Depart-
ment of Labor were based on consultation among trusted 
1 Among the problem. identified were overstaffing, lack of fisral control, 
poor b'lokkeeping, lack of eommunicatwn among PSC staff, and the l11rk 
of a full-time project director. Letter of March 20, 1973 from Charles: 
Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App, at 38-40. 
a See id., at 39. 
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advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative 
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that 
the three individuals terminated did not work well together, 
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would 
improve PSC's efficiency. The court accepted this explana-
tion as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the 
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were 
prompted by gender discrimination. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. 
608 F. 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District 
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as 
Project Director was better qualified for that position than 
respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court 
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not 
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's find-
ing that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respond-
ent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision 
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed 
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title 
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the existence of legitimate 110ndiscriminatory reasons 
for the employment action and that the defendant also must 
prove by objective evidence that those hired or promoted were 
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that 
Fuller's testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary 
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the .iudgment of the District 
('ourt and remanded the case for computation of backpay.3 
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the bur-
den or" proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpreta-
t.ions of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals,4 
s The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court's JUdgment that 
petitioner did not violate Title VII's equal pay provisiou, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (h), but that decision is not challenged here. 
4 See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60 (CA2 1980); Jackson v. 
U, S, Steel Corp., 624 F. 2d 436 (CA3 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery 
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we gritnted certior.ar.i- U. S. -· (1980). We now vacate 
the Fifth Circuit's decision and I'etnahd for application of the 
correct standard. 
II 
In McDonnell DoU{)las Corp. v. Greeri, 411 U, R. 792 (1973) , 
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of pres-
ent,ation of proof in a 'fiti{' VII case alleging discriminatory 
treatment.5 First. the plaintiff has the burden of proving by 
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to artic-
ulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection." id., at 802. Third. shouid the defendant 
carry this burden. the plaintiff must then have an opportunity 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrim!natlon. ld., at 804. 
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant 
should be understooJ in light of the piaintiff's ultimate and 
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading 
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionaiiy discriminated 
against the piaintiff remains at ail time with the plaintiff. 
See Board of Trustees of Keene State Coliege v. Sweeney, 439 
tJ. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); iJ., at 2§ (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
See generally 0 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (Sd ed. 1940) (the 
burden of persuasion "never shifts;' ). The M cbonnell Doug-
las division of intefmediate evidentiary burdens serves to 
'county Government, ~i FEP Cases iiol (CA4 1980}; toeb v. Textron, 
Inc., 600 F .2d 1003 (CAl 1979). But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec . 
Coi'P., 620 F . ~d 855 (C~S i9so) , cert. pending, No,S0-276. 
5 We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character 
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially 
neuLml employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected 
classes. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U. S., at 802, n . 14; Team-
ai'e~8 v. Vhi'ted States, 4.31 U.S. 324, 335-336, and n. l5 (im7). 
,, 
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to 
this ultimate question. 
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment is not onerous. In the instant case, respo11dent had 
only to show that she was a qualified woman who sought an 
available position, but was rejected in favor of a man. See 
McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802. 'The prima facie case 
serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates 
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintifi''s 
rejection. As the Court explained in Furnco C0'118truction Co. 
v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978), the prima facie case 
"raises an inference of discrimination only because we pre-
sume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are mote likely than 
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a pre-
sumption that the employer unlawfully discrimiuated a.gainst 
the employee. If the employer is silent in the face of this 
presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff' 
because no issue of fact t•emains in the caM. 
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evi-
dence that the piaintili was rejected, ot someone else was pre-
ferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The de-
fendant need not persuade the court that it was actually mo-
tivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25. 
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plain-
tifi'.6 To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set 
e This evidentiary relationship between the presumption created by a 
prima facie ease and the consequential burden of production placed on the 
dP-fendant is a traditiOnal feature of the common law. "The word 'pre-
sumption' properly used refers only to a device for allocating the pro-
duction burden ." F . James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, at 255 
(2d edo 1977) (footnote omitted). See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 849i (3d Ed 1940) 0 Cf, J 0 Maguire, Evi~ence, Common Sense and Cob1, 
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forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the 
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation pro .. 
vided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the 
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of produc-
tion, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is re-
butted/ and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of 
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defend-
ant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima 
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and 
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the 
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate 
pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should 
be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions. 
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now 
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered 
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. 
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the court that she has been the victim of intentional dis-
crimination. She may succeed in this either directly by per-
suading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy oi credence. 
See M cDonneU Doug.ias, sufi'ttl, at 804-805. 
inon Law, 185-186 (1947). Usually, assessing the burden of production 
helps the judge determine whether the litigants have created an issue of 
fact to be decided by the jury. ln a Title VII case, the allocation of 
burdens ~lld the creation of a rresumption by t'he establishment of a prima 
facie case is intended progres:!nvely to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive 
factual question of intentional discrimination. 
7 See generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on 'l!vidl'nce 346 (1898). 
In saying that the presumption drops from the t:ase, we do not mean to 
imply lhat inferenres of discrimination or intent suggE'Bted by the plain-
tiff's evidence a're irnpcrmi:s~>ihle. We merely :=;:ty that, such infermces are 
no longer mandatory a.fter the defrnda.nt has given 1t lt•gally sufficient 
explanation for his action. The plaintiff's evidence and its permissible 
inferences then should be evaluated in the context of the total evidenc~ 
Qn the is~'Uc of whether the defendant's explanation is preLext\\ul. 
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III 
In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the 
discharge of respondent from PSC was unrciated to her sex, 
the Court of Appeals adhered to two ruies it had devPloped 
to elaborate the defendant;s burden ot proof. First, the de-
fendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that 
legitimate. nondiscriminatory reasous for the dischargr PxistPd. 
608 F. 2d. at 567. See 1''urner v. Texas instrurnentis, luc., 555 
F. 2d 1251, i255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden, 
the defendant "must prove that those he hired ... were 
. " . ~ • l " 
somehow better qualified than was plamtiff; ii1 other words, 
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 ( empha-
sis in originai). See East v. Romine, inc., 518 F. 2d 332, 
3:39- 340 (CA5 1975) . 
A 
Tl1e Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the 
burden that McDonneii Douglas and its progeny place on thP 
defendaut. See Part H, supra. We stated in Sweeney that 
"the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 'explains what 
he has done' or 'produc[es1 evidence of legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons. ' " 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id. , 
at 28 29 (STEVENS. J., dissenting). lt is plain that the Court 
of A~peals required much more: it piaced on the defendant 
the burden of persuading the court that had co11viucing, ob-
jective reasons for prefl'rring the chosen applicant abon• the 
plaintiff.8 
• The colll't reviewed the defendant's evidence and explainrd its 
defir1en c:y· 
"Dcfendnnt failrd to in troduce comparative factual data. concerning 
Bnrdine and Walz. Fuller Int>rely lestifieu that he discharged and re-
tained per~onnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recom-
mendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the 
position he wAs ret nined to do . Fuller failrd to sperify any objective 
rritel'ia on wh1 eh he b:1sed the decision to discharge Burdine and retain 
Wnlz. He stat rd only that the action was m thr brst inlcre. t of the 
pjoogbffi. and that the~e had been ~omc fri ction within thr department that 
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The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeney on the grounds 
that the case held only that the defendant did not have th~ 
burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But 
this distinction slights the rationaie of Sweeney and of our 
pther cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's 
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the em-
ployer articuiates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to 
satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only pro-
duce admissibie evidence which, in the absence of any evi-
dence of pretext, would aiiow the trier of fact rationally to 
conclude that the employment decision had not heen moti-
vated by cliscrimi~atory animus. ;rhe Court of Appeals 
would require.the defendant tq introduce evidence which, in 
the absence of any evidence of pretext, would persuade the 
trier of fact that the employment action was lawful. This 
exceeds what properly can be demanded to satisfy a burden 
of production . . 
The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defend-
ant apparently because it feared that "[i]f an employer need 
~mly articulate-not prove-a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for his .action, he may c~mpose fictitious, but legiti~ 
mate, reasons for his actions." Turner v. Texas Instruments, 
Inc., supra, at 1255 .(emphasis in original). We do not be-
lieve, however, .that limiting the defendant's evidentiary obli-
gation to a burden of production. w,ill unduly hinder the plain-
tiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its 
legitimate -reasons must be .clear and reasonably specific. 
Supra, ,at. 5-6. See Loeb v. 71extron, Inc. , 600 F. 2d 1003, 
1011- 1012, n. 5 (CA11979). This obligation arises both from 
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination aris-
might be allel'iated by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indi-
cates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This 
court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualification" a.~;~d 
i~prjorn work rcc·ord" insufficient absent data that ·will ·allo-..y ~~ true com-
pt\rtbon of the individuals hired and reject ed." 608 F . 2d, at 568. 
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ing from the prima facie case and from the requirement that 
the plaintiff be afforded "a full and fair opportunity" to 
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does 
not beal' a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant never-
theless retains an. incentive to persuade the trier of fact that 
the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant 
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its expla-
nation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any 
civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a 'l'itle VII suit 
by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's investigatory files. See EEOC v. Associated Dry 
Goods Corp.,-- U. S. ~ (1981 ). Giveu these factors, we 
are unpersuaded that the plaintiff will nnd it particularly 
difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual 
basis is a pretext. We remain confident that the McDonnell 
Douglas framework permits the plain tiff meriting relief to 
demonstrttte intentionttl discrimination. 
B 
The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant 
to prove by objective evidence that the persou hireu or 
promoted was more qualified than the piaintiff. McDonnell 
Douglas teaches that it is the piaintift's task to demonstrate 
that similarly situated empioyees were not treated equally. 
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of'Appeais' rule would require 
the employer to show that the piaintiff's objective qualifi-
cations were inferior to those of the person selected. If 
it cannot, a court would, in efl"ect, concluue that it has 
discriminated. 
The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error. 
Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based 
upon race, sex and national origin. "The broad, overriding 
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is effi-
cient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair 
nn:cl ~ ~ ~ ne·uttal employment and personnel decisions." Me-
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Donnel Douglas, supra, at 801. Title VII, howeveF, does not 
demfl,nd that an employer give preferential treatment to mi-
norities or women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j). See Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 (1979). · The stat-: 
ute was not intended to "diminish traditional management 
prerogatives." id., at 207. It does not require the employer 
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the num-
ber of minorl.ties and women h1red. Furrico Construction Co. 
v. Waters, 438 U.S., at 577-578. 
The views of th~ .Court of Appeals can be read, we think, as 
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female appli-
cant whenever . that perso~'s obiective quali~ca_tions were 
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does 
not obligate a~ empioyer to accord this preference. . Rather, 
the employer has discretion to choose among equally quali-
fied c~ndidates, Pt~vided the decision is not based upon un-
lawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the 
employer misjudged the qualifications of the appiicants does 
not in itself expose him to Title VII liabiiity, although this 
may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pre-
texts for discrhnination. Loeb v. Textron, 1nc., supra, at 
1012, n . 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2 
1980). 
IV 
In summary, the Court of Appeais erred by requiring the 
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the 
existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the 
respondent and that the person retained in her stead had 
superior objective qualifications for the position.9 When the 
a Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal staJJdard to the 
evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it erred in not review-
ing the District Court's finding of no intentional discrimination under 
the "clearly erroneous'' standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a). 
Addressing this issue in this case wouJd be inappropriate because the 
District Court made no findings on the intermediate questions posed by 
M cDonn~U Douglas. 
.. 
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plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the 
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered • 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Peter DATE: Jan. 5, 1981 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Burdine 
On the basis of a first reading of your draft 
opinion of January 5, my comments are as follows: 
I find virtually nothing in the opinion with which 
I disagree, and you have written it well and clearly. As 
you anticipated, however, it is long for an opinion that can 
be viewed as necessary to clarify confusion as to my use of 
the word "articulate• in McDonnell Douglas. 
There always is the danger of creating fresh 
confusion by going into detail and citing hypothetical 
examples. Nor do I think it necessary to rebut some of the 
reasons apparently relied on by CAS beyond making clear that 
it has misread our cases. 
I think Parts I and II are excellent, except I 
suggest a revision of the paragraph commencing on page 10 
(see my rider A, p. 10). 
The place to do the •cutting" is in Part III. I 
move along quite well until I reach page 14. The paragraph 
commencing on that page can, I think, be omitted - or 
possibly the point made in a summarized version in a 
footnote. Also, I doubt the desirability of including the 
long paragraph that commences near the top of page 16. It 
makes a sound and important point (that a defendant is 
required to prove that the person hired or promoted was more 
qualified than the plaintiff), but does not your paragraph 
commencing at the top of page 17 - possibly with some 
embellishment - make the substance of the point? If 
agree, we could eliminate from the middle of page 14 
top of page 17. ~:~~~~lili 
I believe the rest of the opinion is fine. 
If you agree with my suggestions, 
draft and deliver it to your editor. 
forward promptly. 
* * * 
I believe the Reporter's Office style book 
requires that "Court of Appeals" and "District Court" be 
written with initial caps whenever we are speaking about a 
specific appellate or district court. You might 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring . 
As I understand the Court's opinion, it holds, in essence, 
that the ordinary Rules of Procedure and Rules of Evidence 
applicable in all federal litigation also apply in Title VII 
cases. I agree, and I add these comments merely to explain my 
understanding of certain aspects of that holding. 
1. The Burden of Persuasion 
The plaintiff must allege that the defendant discriminated 
against her because of her sex, must offer evidence that raises 
an inference of discrimination, and must persuade the trier of 
fact that the defendant's employment decision was actually 
motivated by the fact that she was a woman. She bears the burden 
of persuasion throughout the litigation. The contrary holding of 
the Court of Appeals was erroneous and must be reversed. 
2. The Prima Facie Case 
To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must introduce 
,-- - . 
\ . 
- 2 - \. 
evidence which, if believed and if unanswered, indicates that it 
is more likely than not that defendant discriminated against her 
because of her sex.l Proof that she was one of two equally 
qualified persons who applied for a job simultaneously would not 
be sufficient; but any evidence tending to indicate that a 
neutral decisionmaker would have selected her, creates a 
presumption of discrimination. 
If defend a nt adduces no evidence, and if the trier of fact 
credits the plaintiff's evidence, the presumption of 
discrimination created by plaintiff's prima facie case mandates 
the entry of judgment for the plaintiff. If cross examination of 
the plaintiff d emonstrates that her testimony was unworthy of 
belief, however, the trial judge has the authority to enter 
judgment for the defendant without requiring any further 
evidence.2 In the typical case, of course, the presumption of 
discrimination will shift the burden of proceeding to the 
defendant. 
1 See McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 
(1978). 
2 For example, if a plaintiff testified that she was qualified 
for a professorship in English, but that a university had refused 
to employ her because of her sex, and cross-examination revealed 
that she had failed to graduate from high school and consistently 
misunderstood ordinary words and phrases used in the courtroom, 
no purpose would be served by requiring the defendant to offer 
evidence of her lack of qualification. 
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3. Defendant's Burden of Proceeding 
The defendant's burden of responding to the presumption of 
discrimination in a Title VII case is the same as that set forth 
in Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 By offering 
evidence of a nondiscriminatory motivation for the employment 
decision, the defendant dispels the presumption of discrimination 
and creates the critical issue of fact. At this point, although 
plaintiff has the right to offer additional evid e nce of prete xt, 
she has no obligation to do so and is entitled to prevail if the 
e vidence already in the record is sufficient to persuade the 
trier of facts that her sex was a factor motivating the 
defendant's decision. 
4. The "Pretext" Issue 
The plaintiff may rebut the defendant's evidence of 
nondiscriminatory reasons for her rejection in two quite 
different ways. She may persuade the trier of fact that no 
3 Rule 301, "Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and 
Proceedings," provides 
"In all civil actions and proceedings not 
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these 
rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom 
it is directed the burden of going forward with 
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not 
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of 
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the 
trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast." 
I 
l 
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factual basis for the defendant's explanation exists. Thus, for 
example, testimony that she was discharged because she was always 
late for work could be overcome by convincing evidence that she 
was always prompt. Alternatively, she may admit the factual 
basis for the employer's explanation--she was indeed a half hour 
late every morning--but nevertheless persuade the trier of fact 
that she would not have been discharged if she had been a male. 
Perhaps her evidence might reveal that similar male tardiness had 
been tolerated or that the decisionmaker had otherwise disclosed 
a bias against female employees. . ·, 
The point to be emphasized is that a mixed motivation is not 
permissible in the employment discrimination context. Although 
the invidious subjective intent of an individual lawmaker will 
not invalidate otherwise permissible legislative action,4 an 
employment decision that is motivated in part by the employee's 
substandard performance and in part by her gender is 
categorically prohibited by the statute. The employee's burden 
on the "pretext" issue is merely to persuade the trier of fact 
that her sex played some part in the employer's decision; if she 
had been a member of the opposite sex, she would have been 
retained. 
On the understanding that the foregoing is consistent with 
4 washington v. Davis, 4265 u.s. 229, 253 (1976) (STEVENS, J. 
concurring). 
•';. 
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the Court's opinion, I join that opinion • 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1764 
Texas Depar,tment of Community~ On Writ of Certiorari to 
Affairs, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v~ of Appeals for the Fifth 
Joyce Ann Burdine. Circuit. 
[January -, 1981] 
JusTICE PowE~I.. delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address again the nature of the 
evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an em-
ployment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The nar-
row question presented .ls whether, after the piaintiff has 
. proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the t 
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a 
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for the challenged employment action existed. 
I 
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs 
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for 
the position of accounting clerk in the Phbiic Service Careers 
Division ( PSC). PSC provided training and employment 
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers. 
When hired , respondent possessed several years' experience in 
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services 
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in No-
vember of that year, and respondent was assigned additional 
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of 
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months. 
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depart-
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned 
about inefficiencies at PSC.1 In February, 1973, the Depart-
ment notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller, 
that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA 
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to 
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC re-
forming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were 
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a com-
plete reorganization of the PSC staff.2 
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired 
a male from another division of the agency as Project Direc-
tor. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired r3spondent a long 
with two other employees, and retained another male, 'Valz, as 
the only professional employee in the division. It is undis-
puted that respondent had maintained her application for the 
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with 
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and as-
signed to another division of the agency. She received the 
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the sub-
sequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and 
responsibility commemurate with what she would haYc re-
ceived had she heen appointed Project Director. 
Responrlent filed this suit in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that 
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to ter-
minate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court 
held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. 
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employ-
ment decisions necessitated by the commands of the Depart-
ment of Labor were based on consultation among trusted 
1 Among the problems identified were overstaffing, brk of fiscal control, 
poor b r:okkecping, lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lark 
of a full-time project director. Letter of Marrh 20, 1973 from Charle& 
Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App., at 38-40. 
2 See icl.> at 39. 
r9-1V64-0PINION 
TEXAS DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. BURDINE 3 
advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative 
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that 
the three individuals terminated did not work well together, 
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would 
improve PSC's efficiency. The court accepted this explana-
tion as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the 
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were 
prompted by gender discrimination. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. 
608 F. 2d 563 ( 1979). The court held that the District 
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as 
Project Director was better qualified for that position than 
respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court 
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not 
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's find-
ing that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respond-
ent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision 
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed 
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title 
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons 
for the employment action and that the defendant also must 
prove by ob.iective evidence that those hired or promoted were 
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that 
Fuller's testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary 
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District 
Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay.3 
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the bur-
den of proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpreta-
tions of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals,• 
s The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court's judgment that 
petitioner did not violate Title VII's equnl pav provision, 42 U. S. C; 
§ 2000e-2 (h) , but that decision is not challf'nged here . 
4 See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F . 2d 60 (CA2 1980) : Jackson v. 
U . . f) . .S.teel Corp ., 624 F. 2d 4'36·. (CA3 1980) ; AmbJts'h w. Mont,gomery 
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we granted certiorari- U. S.- (1980), We now vacate 
. . ' 
~he Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for application of the 
correct standard. 
II 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4i1 U. s .-792 (1973), 
we set forth the basic allocation of bu~dens and order of pres~ 
entation of proof in a Title VII case alieging discriininatory 
treatment.3 First, t~e plainti~ has the burden of proving by 
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the. 
prima facie case, the burden. shifts to the defendant "to artie~ 
ulate some 1egitimat~, nondiscriminatory . reason for. the em~ 
ployee's rejection. 1 ~ . !d., at 802. Third, should the defendant 
9arry this burden, the plaintiff must then.have an opportunity 
~ prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by .~he defendant were nQt its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. ld., at 804. 
The nature of the burden that shifts to , the defendant 
should be understood in,. light pf the plaintiff's ultimate and 
intermediate burdens, The ultimate burden of persuading 
the trier of fa<~t that-.the defendant iptentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff. 
See Board of Trustees of Ke,ene State College v~ Sweeney, 439 
U.S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); id., at 29 (STEVENS, i.,. dissenting). 
See generaliy 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2~89 (3d ed. 194p) (the 
\>urden of persuasion 11never shifts~'). The McDonnell Doug7 
las division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to 
County Government, 22 FEP Cases 1101 (CA4 1980); Loeb v. Textron, 
Inc., 600 F .2d ;10(}3· (CA1 1979) . But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp ., 620 F. 2d .65~ (CA8 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-276. 
• We have recognized that: the factual issues, and therefore the character 
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially 
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on · protec~rd 
cl88Sell. [ Seellfq!Jonnell-Dougl~: supra, 4q U., f3., a;t·8Q21;:.lJ..l4; Tea~­
ater'a v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-336, and n. l5 (i977). 
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to 
this ultimate question. 
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a 
proponderence of the evidence that she applied for an avail-
able position, for which she was quaiified, but was rejected 
under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlaw-
ful discrimination.0 The prima facie case serves an important 
function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. See 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324. 358 & n. 44 (1977). 
As the Court expiained in Furnco Constr·uctio'ii Co. v. Waters, 
438 U. S. 5G7, 577 (1978), the prima facie case "raises an 
inference of discrimination only because we presume these 
acts, if otherwise unexpiained, are more iikeiy than not based 
on the consideration of impermissibie factors.;' Establish-
ment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumptioli 
that the employer uniawfuliy discriminated against the em• 
ployee. If the . trier of ~act believes the plaintiff's evidence, J 
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, 
6 In MrDonnell bougla~>, supra. we described an appropriate model for 
a prima facie case of racial cliscrlmination. The plaintiff must show: 
"(i) that he br.>longs to a raciai minority; (ii) that he applird and was 
qualifird for a job for which the empioyer was seeking applicants; 
(iii) that, dPspite his qualification, he was rrjected; and (iv) that; after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applieant~ from persons of complainant's qualifications." 411 U. S., 
at 802. 
We added, howenr, that this standard is not inflexible, as "[t] he facts 
nccess:uily will Yar~· in Title VII cm'f'S, and the specification abo,·e 
of thr prima facie proof required from respondent is not nect>sSarily appli-
cable in eyrry respect in differing factual situations." !d., at 802, n. 13. 
In the instant. ca~e. it is not. seriou~ly conte~ted tha.t respondent has 
proYed a prima f11cie ca::;e. Shr showrd that ~he was a qualified woman 
who sought an available po::;ition, but thP po~ition wa~ left open for t:everal 
mouths bdore ~he finall~' was rrjeeted in favor of a male who had been 
undPr her ~up<·rvi~ion, 
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the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no 
issue of fact remains in the casc.7 
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evi-
dence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was pre-
ferred, for a iegitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The de-
fendant need not persuade the court that it was actually mo-
tivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25. 
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plain-
tiff.8 To accomplish this, the defendant must ciearly set 
forth, through the introduction of ad:r:nissible ~vidence, the 
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.9 The explanation pro-
vided must be iegally suff!.cient to justify ~ judgment for the 
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of produc-
tion, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is re.; 
r The phrase "prima facie case" may denote not. only the establishment 
of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by 
courts to de:>cribe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to 
permit the trier of fact . to infer the fact at issue. 9 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDormeU Douyla.s should have made it apparent 
that in the Title VII context we u:;e "prima facie ea::;e" in the former 
eense. 
8Titis t>Vi!lentiary relatiuntJhip betwt>en the pr!:'Sumption created by !l 
prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the 
defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. "The word 'pre-
sumption' properly used refers only to a device for ai,locat~_ng_ the pro-
duction burden." F. James & Q. Hazard, Civil Pro~edure § 7.9, at 255 
(2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted). See generally !} Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 2491 (3d Ed. 1940). Cf. J. 1\Taguire, Evidence, Co~mo_n Sense and Com-
mon Law, 185-i86 (1947). Usually, assessing the burden o.f production 
helps the judge . determine whether the litigants have created an issue of 
~act to be decided by the jury. In a Title VII ca~e, the allocation of 
burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima 
facie rase is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive 
factual question of intentional discrimination. 
'An articulation not admitted into !'vid!:'tlCP will not suffice. Tlm8, the 
defendant. cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to th~ coln:.. 
plaint· or 'by ar~t!nent of 'CounseL 
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butted/0and the factual inquiry proceds to a new level of 
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defend-
ant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima 
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and 
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the 
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate 
pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should 
be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions. 
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now 
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered 
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. 
This burden new merges with the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the court that she has been the victim of intentional dis-
crimination. She may succeed in this either directly by per-
suading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered expianation is unworthy of credence. 
See M cDonnelt Douglas, supra, at 804-805. 
in 
In reversing the judgment of_ the District Court that the 
discharge of respondent from PSC was unrelated to her sex, 
the Court of Appeals adhered to two ruies it had developed 
to elaborate the ciefencianes burden of proof. First, the de-
fendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidenc;e that 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed. 
10 See generally .T. Tlm~·e r, Preliminary Treati::;e on Evidence 346 (1898). 
In saying that the presumption drops from the ca::;e, we do not imply that 
the trier of fac:t no longer may consider evidence previou::;ly introduced by 
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A ~atisfactory explanation by 
the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of disrrimination 
arising from the plaintiff'~ initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence 
and inf(~n·nce::; Jlroperly drawn the ref rom may bt• con:-;idered b~· thr trier 
of fact. on the issue of whether the defendant's explanat-ion is pretextual. 
Indeed, there may be some cases where the palintitT's initial eviden('e, com-
bined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to 
di::iereClit the defendant1s ex.palnati~'n·. 
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G\08 F. 2d. at 567. See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 
F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden, 
the defendant "must prove that those he hired ... were 
somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words, 
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 ( empha-
sis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332, 
339-340 (CA5 1975). 
A 
The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the 
burden that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the 
defendant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that 
11 the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 1explains what 
he has done' or 1produc res l evidence of legitimate nondis-
eriminatory reasons.'" 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id., 
at 28, 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court 
of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant 
the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, 
objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above 
the plaintiff.11 
The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeneu on the ground 
that the case held only that the defendant did not have the 
burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But 
11 Thr court review the defPndRnt's evidPnce and explainPd its 
deficienry: 
"Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning 
Burdine and Walz . Fuller merely testified that he discharged and re-
tained personnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recom-
mendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the 
position he was retained to do. Fulter failed to specify any objective 
criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain 
Walz. He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the 
program and that there had been some friction within the department that 
might be n!lcYiatPd by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indi-
rates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This 
court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualification" and 
"prior work record" insufficient absent data that will allow a true co'm-
pariso». l:l.f th~ h'ldividuals hired and rejected." 608 F. 2d, at 568. 
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this distinction slights the rationale of Sweeney and of our 
other cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's 
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the em-
ployer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to 
satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only pro-
duce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact I 
rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not 
been motivated by discriminatory animus. The Court of Ap-
peals would require the defendant to introduce evidence 
which, in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would 
persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was 
lawful. This exceeds what properly can be demanded to 
satisfy a burden of production. 
The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defend-
ant apparently because it feared that "[i] f an employer need 
only articulate-not prove-a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legiti-
mate, reasons for his actions.;; Turner v. Texas Instruments, 
inc., supra, at i255 (emphasis in original). We do not be"' 
lieve, however, that limiting the defendant's evidentiary obii-
gation to a burden of production wiil unduiy hinder the plain-
tiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's expianation of its 
legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific. 
Supra, at 5-6. See Loeb v. Textron. inc., 600 F. 2d 1003, 
1011-1012, n. 5 (CAl 1979). This obligation arises both from 
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination aris-
ing from the prima facie case and from the requirement that 
the plaintiff be afforded "a full and fair opportunity" to 
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does 
not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant never-
theless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that 
the employment decision was lawful. Thus. the defendant 
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its expla-
nation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any 
civil suit i1; federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit 
by ;the .i)laintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
79-1764-0PINION 
10 TEXAS DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. BURDINE 
Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint. 
See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., - U. S. - · 
(1981). Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the 
plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a prof-
fered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We 
remain confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework 
permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate inten-
tional discrimination. 
B 
The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant 
to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or 
promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. · McDonnell 
Douglas teaches that it is the piaintiff's task to demonstrate 
that simi1ar1y situated employees were not treated equally. 
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeais' ruie would require. 
the employer to show that the piaintiff's objective qualifi-
cations were inferior to those of the person seiected. If· 
it cannot, a court would, ih effect, conciude that it has 
discriminated. 
The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error. 
Title VII prohibits ali discrimination in empioyment based 
upon race, sex and nationai origin. 11ifhe broad, overriding 
interest, ~hared by employer, employee, and consumer, is effi-
cient and trus~wort~y workma:t;J-ship assured t~rough fair 
and . . . neutral employment and personnei decisions." · M c-
Donnel Douglas, supra, at 801. Title vii, however, does not 
demand that an employer give pre~erentia1 treatment to mi-
norities or .women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (J). See Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U. $. 193, 205-206 (1979). · The stat-
ute was not intended to 11diminish traditional management 
prerogatives." Id., at 207. It does not require the employer 
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the num-
ber of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Co. 
v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 577-578. 
Tne vtews \lf the Couh of Appeals can be read, we think, lB.s 
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requiring the employer to hire the minority or female appli: 
cant whenever that person's objective qualifications were 
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does 
not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather, 
the employer has discretion to choose among equaily quali-
fied candidates, provided the decision is not based upon un,. 
lawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the 
employer misjudged the qualifications of the appiicants does 
not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this 
~ay be pr<;>bat~ve of whether the emP,ioyer's r~asons are pre-
texts for discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., sitpra, at 
1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2 
1980). 
IV 
. In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the 
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the 
~xistence of n<;mdiscriminatory reasons for terminating th~ 
respondent and that th.e person retained in her stead had 
superior objective qualifications for the position.12 When the 
f.?laintiff has proved
1 
a prim{t fa9ie case of discrimination, the 
defendant bears only the purden of explaining clearly th~ 
nondiscriminatory ~easons for its a_ctions. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is vacated ~nd the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
1 ~ Because the Court of Appeals applied thE' wrong legal standard to the 
evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it ~rred in not review-
ing the District Coul't's finding of no int~ntional discrimination under 
the "clearly erroneous'' standard of Feder!\! Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a). 
Addressing this is~ue in this case w.ould be inappropriate because the 
District Co\lrt made no findings on the intermediate questions pos'ed ~y 
M cDonneU Dou1{Jlas. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1764 
Texas Department of Community) On Writ of Certiorari to 
Affairs, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Joyce Ann Burdine. Circuit. 
[January -, 1981] 
JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address again the nature of the 
evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an em-
ployment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. Thenar-
row question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has 
made out a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a 
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for the challenged employment action existed. 
I 
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs 
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for 
the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers 
Division (PSC). PSC provided training and employment 
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers. 
When hired, respondent possessed several years' experience in 
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services 
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in No-
vember of that year, and respondent was assigned additional 
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of 
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months. 
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depart-
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned 
about inefficiencies at PSC.1 In February, 1973, the Depart-
ment notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller, 
that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA 
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to 
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC re-
forming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were 
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a com-
plete reorganization of the PSG stafP 
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired 
a male from another division of the agency as Project Direc-
tor. In reducing the PSC staff', he fired respondent along 
with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as 
the only professional employee in the division. It is undis-
puted that respondent had maintained her application for the 
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with 
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and as-
signed to another division of the agency. She received the 
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the sub-
sequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and 
responsibility commensurate with what she would have re-
ceived had she been appointed Project Director. 
Respondent filed this suit in the United States Distr:ct 
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that 
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to ter-
minate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court 
held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. 
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employ-
ment decisions nece:;:sitated by the commands of the Depart-
ment of Labor were based on consultation among trusted 
1 Among the problems identified were overstaffing, lack of fiscal control, 
poor bnokkeeping, lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lark 
of a fnll-time project director . Letter of March 20, 1973 from Charles 
Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App., at 38-40. 
2 See id., at 39. 
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advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative 
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that 
the three individuals terminated did not work well together, 
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would 
improve PSC's efficiency. The court accepted this explana-
tion as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the 
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were 
prompted by gender discrimination. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. 
608 F . 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District 
Court 's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as 
Project Director was better qualified for that position than 
respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court 
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not 
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's find-
ing that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respond-
ent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision 
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed 
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title 
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons 
for the employment action and that the defendant also must 
prove by ob.iective evidence that those hired or promoted were 
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that 
Fuller's testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary 
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District 
Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay.8 
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the bur-
den of proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpreta-
tions of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals,' 
• 8 The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court's judgment that 
petitioner did not violate Title VII's equal pay provision, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (h) , but that derision is not challenged here. 
4 See, e. g. , Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F . 2d 60 (CA2 1980) ; Jackson v. 
U. $. Steel Corp ., 624 F . 2d 436 · (CA3 1980) ; Ambush v. Montgomery 
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we granted certiorari- U. S.- (1980). We now vacate 
the Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for application of the 
correct standard. 
II 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of pres-
entation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory 
treatment.5 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by 
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to artic-
ulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection." I d., at 802. Third. should the defendant 
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. I d., at 804. 
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant 
should be understood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and 
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading 
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff. 
See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 
U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); id., at 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (the 
burden of persuasion "never shifts~'). The McDonnell Doug-
las division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to 
County Government, 22 FEP Cases 1101 (CA4 1980); Loeb v. Textron, 
Inc., 600 F .2d 1003 (CAl 1979). But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp ., 620 F. Zd 655 (CAS 1980), cert. pending, No. 80--276. 
5 We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character 
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that n, facially 
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected 
classes. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U. S., at 802, n. 14; Team-
aterB 'V. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-336, and n. 15 (1971). 
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to 
this ultimate question. 
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment is not onerous. In the instant case, respondent had 
to persuade the court by evidence that she was a qualified ( 
woman who sought an available position, but was rejected in 
favor of a man. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802. 
The prima facie case serves an important function in the liti-
gation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory 
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. As the Court explained 
in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 
(1978), the prima facie case "raises an inference of discrim-
ination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise un-
explained, are more likely than not based on the consideration 
of impermissible factors." Establishment of the prima facie 
case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlaw-
fully discriminated against the employee. If the employer is 
silent in the face of this presumption, the court must enter 
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in 
the case. 
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evi-
dence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was pre-
f<>rred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The de-
fendant need not persuade the court that it was actually mo-
tivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25. 
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plain-
tiff.0 To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set 
6 This evidentiary relationship between the presumption created by a 
prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the 
defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. "The word 'pre-
sumption' properly used refers only to a device for allocating the pro-
duction burden." F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, at 255 
(2d Pd. 1977) (footnote omitted). See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 2491 (3d Ed. 1940) . Cf. J . Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense .and Com-
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forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the 
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.7 The explanation pro-
vided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the 
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of produc-
tion, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is re-
butted,8 and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of 
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defend-
ant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima 
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and 
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the 
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate 
pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should 
be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions. 
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now 
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered 
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. 
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuad-
mon Law, 185-186 (1947). Usually, assessing the burden of production 
helps the judge determine whether the litigants have created an issue of 
fact to be decided by the jury. In a Title VII case, the allocation of 
burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima 
facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive 
factual question of intentional discrimination. 
7 An articulation not adinitted into evidence wiU not suffice. Thus, the I 
defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the com-
plaint or by argument. of counsel. 
8 Sec generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatil:ie on Evidence 34B (1898). 
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not mean to 
imply that inferences of discrimination or intent suggested by the plain-
tiff's evidence are impermissible. We m<>rely sny that such inferences are 
no longer mandatory ttfter the defendtmt has given a legally sufficient 
explanation for his action. The plaintiff's evidence and its pem1issible 
inferences then should be evaluated in the context of the total evidence 
on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. Thus, I 
there ma.y be cases where thP plaintiff'l:i initial evidence, perhaps com-
bined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will el:ital~lisl~ pre-
text without the plaintiff presenting a fomHtl rebuttal of the defendall't's 
(}Xpianation. 
79-1764-0PINION 
TEXAS DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. BURDINE !/ 
ing the court that she has been the victim of intentional dis-
crimination. She may succeed in this either directly by per-
suading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 
See McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 804-805. 
III 
In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the 
discharge of respondent from PSC was unrelated to her sex, 
the Court of Appeals adhered to two rules it had developed 
to elaborate the defendant's burden of proof. First, the de-
fendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed. 
608 F. 2d, at 567. See Turner v. Texas instruments, Inc., 555 
F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977) .. Second, to satisfy this burden, 
the defendant "must prove that those he hired . . . were 
somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words, 
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 (empha-
sis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332, 
339-340 (CA5 1975). 
A 
The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the 
burden that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the 
defendant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that 
"the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 'explains what 
he has done' or 'produc[ es] evidence of legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons.' " 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id., 
at 28, 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court 
of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant 
the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, / 
objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above 
the plaintiff.0 
9 The court reviewed the defendant's evidence and explained its 
deficiency: 
('Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning 
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The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeney on the ground / 
that the case held only that the defendant did not have the 
burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But 
this distinction slights the rationale of Sweeney and of our 
other cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's 
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the em-
ployer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to 
satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only pro-
duce admissible evidence which, in the absence of any evi-
dence of pretext, would allow the trier of fact rationally to 
conclude that the employment decision had not been moti-
vated by discriminatory animus. · The Court of Appeals 
would require the defendant to introduce evidence which, in 
the absence of any evidence of pretext, would persuade the 
trier of fact that the employment action was lawful. This 
exceeds what properly can be demanded to satisfy a burden 
of production. 
The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defend-
ant apparently because it feared that "[i]f an employer need 
only articulate-not prove-a legitimate. nondisrriminatorv 
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legiti-
mate, reasons for his actions." Turner v. Texas Instruments, 
Inc., supra, at 1255 (emphasis in original). We do not be-
lieve, however, that limiting the defendant's evidentiary obli-
gation to a burden of production will unduly hinder the plain-
Burdine and Walz. Fuller merdy testified that he discharged and re-
tained personnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recom-
mendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the 
position he was retained to do. Fuller failed to specify any objective 
criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain 
W lz. He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the 
program and that there had been some friction within the department that 
might be alleviated by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indi-
cates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This 
court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualification" and 
"prior work record" insufficient absent data that will allow a true com-
pal'ison of the individuals hired and rejected." 608 F. 2d, at 568. 
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tiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its 
legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific. 
Supra, at 5- 6. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003, 
1011-l012, n. 5 (CAl 1979). This obligation arises both from 
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination aris-
ing from the prima facie case and from the requirement that 
the plaintiff be afforded "a full and fair opportunity" to 
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does 
not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant never-
theless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that 
the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant 
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its expla-
nation. Third , the liberal discovery rules applicable to any 
civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit 
by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
CommiEsion's investigatory files concerning her complaint. / 
See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., - U. S. -
(1981). Given these factors. we are unpersuaded that the 
plaintiff will find it pa.rticularly difficult to prove that a prof-
fered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We 
remain confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework 
permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate inten-
tional discrimination. 
B 
The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant 
to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or 
promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. McDonnell 
Douglas teaches that it is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate 
that similarly situated employees were not treated equally. 
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeals' rule would require 
the employer to show that the plaintiff's objective qualifi-
cations were inferior to those of the person selected. If 
it cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has 
discriminated. 
The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error. 
Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based 
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upon race, sex and national origin. "The broad, overriding 
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is effi~ 
cient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair 
and ... neutral employment and personnel decisions." M c-
Donnel Douglas, supra, at 801. Title VII, however, does not 
demand that an employer give preferential treatment to mi-
norities or women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j) . See Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 (1979). · The stat-
ute was not intended to "diminish traditional management 
prerogatives." Id., at 207. It does not require the employer 
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the num-
ber of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Co. 
v. Waters, 438 U.S., at 577-578. 
The views of the Court of Appeals can be read, we think, as 
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female appli-
cant whenever that person's objective qualifications were 
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does 
not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather, 
the employer has discretion to choose among equally quali-
fied candidates, provided the decision is not based upon un-
lawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the 
employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does 
not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this 
may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pre-
texts for discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., supra, at 
1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2' 
1980). 
IV 
In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the 
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the 
existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the 
respondent and that the person retained in her stead had 
superior objective qualificatiops for the position.1Q When the 
I 
10 BPrau~e the Court of Appeall:l t pplied the wrong legal standard to the· 
~vide:nee, we. have llO occasion to decide whether it erred in not review-
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plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the 
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for 
fprther proceedin~§ cgnsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered, 
ing the District Court's finding of no intentional discrimination under 
the "clearly erroneous'' standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a). 
Addressing this issue in this case would be inappropriate because the 
District Court made no findings on the intermediate questions posed by 
M cDonneU Douglas.. 
-
lfp/ss 1/26/81 Burdine, Rider A 
The applicable standard was stated in general terms in 
McDonnell-Douglas, supra, at 802.6 This tandard was not 
intended to be an inflexible rule, as "[t]he facts 
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the 
specification .•• of the prima facie proof required from 
respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect in 
differing factual situations."" Furnco Construction Corp. 
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978). In this case, the 
fourth element of the standard is inapplicable as the 
position in question was filled with a white applicant. 
Thus, plaintiff here needed only to prove to establish a 
prima facie case that she was a qualified woman, duly 
applied and was qualified for the position to be filled, and 
6. Peter: Here copy the McDonnell-Douglas standard - all 
four parts. 
,. .. ~.. ~ " . 
2. 
- despite her qualifications - she was rejected in favor of 
a man. At this stage of this case, as in many other cases, 
these may be the only facts available to the plaintiff. A 
Title VII plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing 
actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if 
such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than 
not that such actions were "based on a nondiscriminatory 
criterion illegal under the Act". Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 u.s. 324, 358 (1977); Furnco Construction Corp. 
v. Waters, supra, at 576. The prima facie case serves an 
important function in the litigation: it eliminates the 
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's 
rejection. Establishment of such a case in effect creates a 
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated 
against the employee. If the employer remains silent in the 
face of this presumption, the Court normally should enter 
3 • 
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact will 
remain in the case. 
Note to Peter: Take a look at the above reformulation of 
the first full paragraph on page 5 of our opinion. This 
paragraph has continued to give Justice Stevens some 
trouble, and - as you know - has raised some questions in my 
mind. The principal question is whether our paragraph as 
~~ 
presently written can be viewed as stating a standard some ~ 
differently from the way it was articulated in McDonnell-
Douglas and reiterated in subsequent cases. Accordingly, I 
have tried - in the above revision - to quote literally from 
the prior cases, although I end up where we were originally. 
We can talk about this upon my return on Tuesday. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~tqtrtmt ~qmt 4tf tlrt 'Jftnitth ~hrlt.\l 
Jrulfittgfun, ~. ~· 211~,., 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 19, 1981 
Re: 79-1764 - Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine 
Dear Lewis: 
There are several aspects of your opinion 
describing the three-stage procedure in a Title VII 
case that concern me. Let me raise the points 
separately: 
1. Do you intend to lessen the plaintiff's 
burden of making a prima facie case? As I 
had understood McDonell Douglas, it required 
evidence on behalf of the plaintiff that gave 
rise to an inference that an employment 
decision had been made for a discriminatory 
reason. The second full sentence on page 5 
of your opinion, however, implies that every 
time two qualified applicants for a vacancy 
are of a different race or sex, the one who 
does not get the job automatically has a 
~rna facie case. It would seem to me that 
-,:here might be two qualified applicants who 
sought employment at the same time and the 
employer simply took one rather than the 
other. In that situation, I would not think 
a prima facie case would have been made out 
because there would be no basis for an 
inference that the gender of the applicant 
had anything to do with the employment 
decision. In the McDonell Douglas 
hypothesis, on the contrary, the fact that a 
qualified applicant was rejected and 
thereafter the employer continued to 
1n erv1ew other persons and ultimately hired 
one of the opposite sex would give rise to 
~ch an inference. In other words, I think 





that the employment decision was not made on 
neutral cr i t:_e: ia. h J · • ..,HJ., ~# , ~... .., ,; :Y /k~ 
I question whether you are correct in stating 
on page 5 that if the employer fails to put 
on any evidence at all, "the Court must enter 
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue 
of fact remains in the case." It seems to me 
that there may well be cases in which the 
plaintiff's testimony may not be considered 
credible by the judge. For example, one 
could suppose a ninety-five pound person 
testifying that he was qualified for a 
position as a heavy-weight boxer and nothing 
in the written record would dispute what he 
had to say but the judge might simply 
disbelieve him. I would think that a 
defendant would have no obligation to put on 
any evidence and counsel could simply argue 
that even though a prima facie case had been 
made which required that the issue of fact be 
submitted to the trier-of-fact, nevertheless, 
the inference of discriminatory motive was so 
obviously unworthy of belief that judgment 
should be entered for the defendant. In ) 
other words, I believe there is a distinction( 
between the requirement that a prima facie j 
case be submitted to the trier-of-fact and 
one requiring that judgment be entered in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
Because the word "articulated" has given rise 
to some misunderstanding, I wonder if it 
would not be wise to make it clear that the 
word is intended to have reference to 
evidence admitted at the trial and definitely 
would not include a mere articulation by 
counsel or by an answer to a discovery 3 
request. Perhaps this is already obvious I o1"-
but I would be happier if you could see fit 
to make the point expressly. 
I am not sure I entirely understand the so-
called third stage of the case, in which the 
plaintiff is permitted to demonstrate that 
- 3 -
the defendant's explanation for the 
employment decision was pretextual. As I 
read the opinion, it seems to require the 
plaintiff to put on some additional rebuttal 
evidence in every case in which the defendant 
has put on some evidence explaining its 
action. Does this mean that if the plaintiff 
puts on all the evidence that is available in 
his prima facie case in order to make sure 
that an inference of discrimination has been 
established and then the defendant comes 
forward with an explanation of neutral 
reasons which conflicts in some respects with 
the plaintiff's evidence, that the defendant 
must prevail unless the plaintiff puts on 
further evidence? It would seem to me that 
there could well be situations in which a ) 
combination of plaintiff's original case and 
effective cross-examination of the 
defendant's witnesses is adequate to ' ~- n 
establish pretext, and that plaintiff would ~ p~ 
E'(en without_. any r:ebut t~, the trial judge tl.-. "i 
might be convinced that the plaintiff was 
have nothing further to say in rebuttal. (~-- . 
telling the truth and that the defendant's , ~ 
estimony was entirely unworthy of belief. ~ 
n that situation the plaintiff should J ~ 
prevail but, as I read your opinion, it seems 
to imply the contrary. i'Lb 
5. Finally, and perhaps because I disagree with 
the decision in EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods 
Corp., I am not entirely happy about relying 
on any special liberal discovery rule in a 
Title VII case as a justification for a 
procedure that would be different from that 
which should prevail in any other lawsuit. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 




JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
,ju.vrttttt <!fourl o-f tltt ~nittb .thttts 
Jl'ulfhtgtlltt. ~. <!f. 2ll,;t){!' 
January 19, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1764 - Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine 
Dear Lewis: 
You have written a very persuasive opinion, and I am 
glad to join it. 
Sincerely, 
~tit!. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
.·""'""' 
January 21, 1981 
79-1764 Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine 
Dear John: 
Thank you for your comments on my opinion. I do 
not think we are far apart on any one of your points. 
Points 1 and 2: I do not intend to lessen the 
plaintiff's burden of making a prima facie case. To make 
this clearer, I am changing the language in the second 
sentence of the first full paragraph on page 5 to read as 
follows: 
•In the instant case, respondent had to 
persuade the Court by evidence that she was a 
qualified woman who sought an available 
position, but was rejected in favor of a 
man. • 
As noted, proof that the complainant was qualified for the 
position is likely to eliminate the most common 
nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to hire or promote. 
We are talking only about an •inference of discrimination• 
that requires the defendant to come forward with a neutral 
explanation. Part III B makes clear that the plaintiff does 
not win merely by showing he or she was equally qualified. 
Point 3: I certainly wish to make clear that a 
defendant must discharge his burden by introducing evidence. 
Indeed, the word evidence is used four time on pages 5 and 6 
in describing the defendant's burden. In view of your 
concern, I am glad to add a footnote along the following 
lines: 
•An articulation not admitted into 
evidence will not suffice. Thus, the 
defendant cannot meet its burden merely 
through an answer to the complaint or an 
argument by counsel.• 
~ 
·""-'""-"'---'---------~~~----·~·. .~·' .. 
.. . 
-
Point 4: As I think your point is well taken, I 
am adding a sentence at the end of footnote 7 on page 6 as 
follows: 
"Thus, there may be cases where the 
plaintiff's initial evidence, perhaps 
combined with effective cross exmaination of 
the defendant, will establish pretext without 
the plaintiff presenting a formal rebuttal of 
the defendant's explanation.• 
2. 
Point 5: I join you in disagreeing with the 
Court's recent decision in Associated Dry Goods Corp., but I 
suppose this is now the law. 
I have sent these changes to the printer and will 
recirculate a second draft. As four Justices have joined 
me, I will - of course - have to respect their views. As I 
consider my changes to be clarifications rather than 
substantive. I would not expect objections. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
LFP/lab 
CHAMBERS OF 
~nvrtnu (!j:ll'Uft ltf tlr~ ~nittb ~tatt.tr 
~atdfinghtn. ~. <!):. 2llgt>i~ 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 22, 1981 
Re: 79-1764 - Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your response to my letter of 
January 19, 1981. All of your changes are improvements 
and you surely have satisfied my points 3 and 4 and I 
will withdraw my point 5. I regret to say, however, 
that I am still concerned about points 1 and 2. 
First, the facts (1) that an applicant is 
qualified and (2) that a person of the opposite sex was 
hired, do not in my judgment give rise to an inference 
of discrimination. Two years ago I rejected a 
qualified male applicant and hired a female as a law 
clerk; this year I rejected two qualified females and 
hired two qualified males. I do not believe that those 
facts as applied to either year viewed separately were 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, yet under your opinion they are 
sufficient. 
Second, I am still not persuaded that an 
unrebutted prima facie case always requires that 
judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff. I would 
agree with the last sentence of the full paragraph on 
page 5 if it were modified as follows: 
"If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's 
evipence, and if the employer is silent in the 
facl of this presumption, the Court must enter 
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of 
fact remains in the case." 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
1 
I~ Pi/7. / ·~'( 
January 27, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1764, Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine 
Dear Lewis: 
I can join, but I do have one suggestion. 
John has been concerned that language in the 
present draft indicates an unrebutted prima facie case 
calls for a judgment for the plaintiff. I am concerned 
with the opposi~ap~l~m: that footnote 8 in its 
present form coul read to suggest that, despite the 
defendant's rebuttal, discriminatory intent may be 
inferred even if the plaintiff does not persuade the 
' trier of fact that the explanation advanced by the 
defendant is a pretext. In context this reading is 
1 
~- ~ ~ 
unpersuasive, but I wish you would conside1-4 ~y 
clarification along the following tines, to be added 
after ~cite to Thayer. I advance the language only 
' I 
~~"~:r:."r~l';~<~ 
to make clear what I have in mind: ~ - -·-
"In saying that the presumption droPs frotn the ~~· ~1-t~~( 
case, we do not mea:f'l tg. / impl-y that the tt ier of ~ 
~act must reject as u rustworthy evidence 
preViOUSly intrOdU a by -i¥e plaintiff jto make a y L_/ I I 
prima fa~ie case ~he trier may~~ take -, 
that evide~e in o account in deciding whether the 
lanatio~~the defendant a~anees is a pretext. 
say only that once the defendant has rebutted 
plaintiff's prima facie case 13y comi.A-S fo:r;ward 
w~th ~~eenaa~~' discrimination 
is not to be inferred unless the plaintiff ~4A~-- A_ 1 .P.ersuades the trier . that theee~ reasons are .a-..: . - ~ 
preteXQ. The plaintiff nonetheless may argue 
pretextNbased in whole or in part on the same 
evidence introduced to demonstrate a prima facie 
case should that evidence be probative." { 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
. ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
RE: No. 79-1764 
Dear Lewis: 
~nprtntt <ijourl of flrt ~lt ~httt.s 
~ulfingto~ J. <!f. 2!lgt,., 
January 29, 1981 
Affairs v. Burdine 
I believe that a part oft~ confusion concerning the effect of 
the plaintiff's establishment;rf a prima facie case in the Title VII 
context is that the phrase " Hma facie case" ordinarily means that 
th~eintiff has made out case sufficient to go to the jury, i.e., 
suff cient to permit the act-ftnder to draw the desired inference. 
Se C. McCormick, Hand ok of the Law of Evidence, at 640 (1954). In 
the Title VII context, as your proposed opinion indicates, when the 
plaintiff has proven 'her "prima fatie case" by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the fact-finder is required to draw the desired inference 
of discriminatory intent, unless the defendant bears his burden of 
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged 
action. The use of the phrase "prima facie case" in McDonnell Douglas 
is therefore somewhat misleading. Recognizing that my suggestions 
differ to some extent from those offered by John, I nevertheless 
suggest that the following alterations would serve to clarify the 
matter: 
(1) In the first paragraph, second sentence, to change "after the 
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case," which might merely imply o-7'( 
that she has alleged facts sufficient to establish a case, to "after 
the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case. . " 
(2) After the second sentence of Part II, on page 4, to add a 
footnote along these lines: 
In the Title VII context, the phrase "prima facie case" 
does not merely denote the plaintiff's burden of producing 
enough evidence to permit the fact-finder to infer discrimi-
natory intent; rather, the prima facie case, if proved, re-
quires such inference, unless the defendant aritculates a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. 
- 2 -
( 3) On page 5, to insert the phrase, 11 a preponderance of the 11 
between the words 11 bY 11 and 11 evidence 11 in the second sentence, and 
to insert the word 11 mandatory 11 before the word 11 presumption 11 in the 
penultimate sentence. 
(4) On page 8, to delete the phrase 11 in the absence of any evi-
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Texas Department of Community) On Writ of Certiorari to 
Affairs, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Joyce Ann Burdine. ' Circuit. 
[January -, 1981] 
JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address again the nature of the 
evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an em-
ployment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e et seq. Thenar-
row question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has 
proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a 
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for the challenged employment action existed. 
I 
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs 
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for 
the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers 
Division (PSC). PSC provided training and employment 
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers. 
When hired, respondent possessed several years' experience in 
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services 
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in No-
vember of that year, and respondent was assigned additional 
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of 
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months. 
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depart-
.. 
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned 
about inefficiencies at PSC.1 In February, 1973, the Depart-
ment notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller, 
that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA 
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to 
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC re-
forming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were 
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a com-
plete reorganization of the PSC staff.2 
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired 
a male from another division of the agency as Project Direc-
tor. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired r~spondent along 
with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as 
the only professional employee in the division. It is undis-
puted that respondent had maintained her application for the 
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with 
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and as-
signed to another division of the agency. She received the 
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the sub-
sequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and 
responsibility commensurate with what she would have re-
ceived had she been appointed Project Director. 
Respondent filed this suit in the United States Distr:ct 
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that 
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to ter-
minate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court 
held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. 
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employ-
ment decisions necessitated by the commands of the Depart-
1 Among the problems identified were overstaffing, Jack of fiscal control, 
poor b~okkecping , lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lack 
of a full-time project director. Letter of March 20, 1973 from Charles: 
,Johnson to B. R. Fuller , reprinted in App., at 38-40. 
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ment of Labor were based on consultation among trusted 
advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative 
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that 
the three individuals terminated did not work well together, 
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would 
improve PSC's efficiency. The cou;t accepted this explana-
tion as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the 
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were 
prompted by gender discrimination. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. 
608 F. 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District 
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as 
Project Director was better qualified for that position than 
respondent was not Clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court 
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not 
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's find-
ing that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respond-
ent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision 
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed 
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title 
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
·evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons 
for the employment action and that the defendant also must 
prove by objective evidence that those hired or promoted were 
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that 
Fu1ler's testimony did not carrv either of these eviden tiarv 
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District 
Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay.it 
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the · bur-
den of proof borne by the defendant conJlicts with interpreta-
tions of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals,• 
• The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court 's judgment that 
petitioner did not violate Title VII 's equal pa:v provision, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (h) , but that decision is not chali E'nged here. 
4 See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant , 630 F . 2d 60 (CA2 1980) ; Jackson· v. 
U. S. Steel Corp., 624 F . 2d 436 (CA3 1980) ; Ambush v. Montgomew 
,, 
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we granted certiorari- U. S.- (1980). We now vacate 
the Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for application of the 
correct standard. 
II 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) , 
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of pres-
entation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory 
treatment.5 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by 
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to artic-
ulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection." !d., at 802. Third, should the defendant 
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. I d., at 804. 
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant 
should be understood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and 
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading 
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff. 
See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 
U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); id., at 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (the 
burden of persuasion "never shifts"). The McDonnell Doug-
las division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves tO' 
County Government, 22 FEP -Cases 1101 (CA4 1980) ; Loeb v. Textron, 
Inc., 600 F .2d 1003 (CAl 1979) . But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 620 F. 2d 655 (CAS 1980), cert. pending, No. 8~276. 
II We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character 
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially 
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected' 
classes. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U. S., at 802, n. 14; Team-
aters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335-336, and n. 15 (1977) . 
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to 
this ultimate question. 
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a 
proponderence of the evidence that she applied for an avail~ 
able position, for which she was qualified, but was rejected 
under circumstances which gl.ve rise to an inference of unlaw-
ful discrimination.6 The prima facie case serves an important 
function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the piaintiff's rejection. See 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 & n. 44 (1977). 
As the Court explained in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 
438 U. S. 5G7, 577 ( 1978), the prima facie case "raises an 
inference of discrimination oniy because we presume these 
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based 
on the consideration of impermissible factors." Establish~ 
ment of the prima facie ca~ in effect creates a presumption 
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the em~ 
ployee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, 
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, 
6 In MrDonnell Douglas, supra. we described an a.ppropriate model for 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The plaintiff must show: 
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority ; (ii) tha.t he applied and was 
qualified for a jrb for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
(iii) that , despite his qualification, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications ." 411 U. S., 
at 802. 
We added, however, that this standard is not inflexible, as "[t]he facts 
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above 
of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily appli-
cable in every respect in differing factual situations." !d. , at 802, n. 13. 
In the instant case, it is not seriously contested that respondent has 
11roved a prima facie rase. She showed that she was a qualified woman 
who sought an available position, but the position was left open for several 
months bdore she finally was rejected in favor of a male who had been 
under her supervision . 
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the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because nQ 
issue of fact remains in the case.7 
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evi-
dence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was pre• 
ferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The de-. 
fendant need not persuade the court that it was actually mo .. 
tivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25. 
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plain-
tiff.8 To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set 
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the 
reasons for the plaintiff;s rejection.9 The explanation pro-
vided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the 
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of produc-
7 The phrase "prima facie case" may dE:'note not only the establishment 
of a legally mandatory, rE:'buttabl.E:' prE:'sumption, but also may be used by 
courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to 
permit the trier of fact to infer th~ fact at issue. 9 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent 
that in the Title VII context we use "prima facie case" in the former 
5ense. 
8 This evidentiary relntion::<hip betwePn thr pre:;umption erE"<~ ted by a 
prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the 
defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. "The word 'pre-
sumption' properly used refers only to a ·device for allocating the pro-
duction burden." F. James & G. Hazard, civil Procedure § 7.9, at 255 
(2d ed. 1::J77) (footnote omittrd). See Fed. H!Jie Evid. 301. See gener- \ 
ally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2491 (ad Ed . 1940). Cf. J. Maguire, Evi-
dence, Common SenHe and Common Law, 185-186 (1947) . Usually, as-
sr,;...,ing the burdt>n of production help:-; thr judge determinr whether the 
litigants havt> created an i~;sur of fact to br decided by tlw jury. In a 
Title VII rase, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a pre:;umption 
by the e:;tabliohment of a prima facie casr is intendt>d progre::<:;ively to 
sharpen the inquiry into the eluoivc factual que:;tion of intentional 
di;;criminntion. 
9 An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus, the 
defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the com-
plaint or by argument of counsel. 
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tion, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is re-
butted/0and the factual inquiry proceds to a new level of 
~pecificity. Placing this burden of production on the defend~ 
ant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima 
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and 
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the 
plaintiff will have a fuli and fair opportunity to demonstrate 
pretext. The sufficiency o.f the defendant's evidence should 
be evaluated by the extent to which it fuifills these functions. 
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now 
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered 
reason was not the true reason for. the employment decision. 
This burden now merges with the ultimate· burden of persuad-
ing the court that she has been the victim of intentional dis-
crimination. She may succ_eed in this either directly by per-
suading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer .or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 
See McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 804-805. 
III 
In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the 
discharge of respondent _from. PSC was . unrelated to her sex~ 
the Court of Appeals adhered to, two rules it had developed 
to elaborate the defendant's burden of proof. First, the de-
fendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that 
• 1o See generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 346 ( 1898). 
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that 
the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by 
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by 
the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination 
arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence 
and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier 
of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. 
.Indeed, there may be some cases where the palintiff's initial evidence, com-
bined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to 
'discredit the defendant's expalnation. 
.. 
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed. 
608 F. 2d, at 567. See Turner v. Texa.s Instruments, Inc., 555 
F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden, 
the defendant "must prove that those he hired ... were 
somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words, 
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 (empha,., 
sis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332, 
339- 340 (CA5 1975). 
A 
The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the 
burcl.en that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the 
ddcndant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that 
"the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 1explains what 
he has done' or 1produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons.'" 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id., 
at 28, 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court 
of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant 
the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, 
objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above 
the plaintiff.11 
The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeneu on the ground 
that the case held only that the defendant did not have the 
11 The court review the defendant's evidence and explained its 
'deficiency: 
"Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning 
Burdine and Walz. Fuller merely testified that he discharged and re-
tained personnel in the spring shakeup at TbCA primarily on the recom-
mendations of subordinates and that he considered' 'walz qualified for the 
position he was retained to do . Fuiier failed to specify any objective 
criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain 
Walz . He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the 
program and that t'here had been scme friction within the department that 
might be allel'iated by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indi-
cates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This 
court in Ea.st found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualifiratlon;, and 
"prior work record" insufficient absent data. that will allow a true com-
panson of the individuals hired and rejected ." 608 F. 2d, at 568 . 
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burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. Bu~ 
this distinction slights the rationale of Sweeney and of om 
other cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's 
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the em~ 
ployer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to 
satisfy this intermediate burden, the _emp~oyer need only pro~ 
duce admissible eviqence which wo~ld allow the trier of fact 
rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not 
been motivated by discriminatory_ animus. The Court of Ap~ 
peals would require the defendant to introduce evidence 
which, in the absence of any evidence_ of pretext, would 
persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was 
lawful. This exceeds what properly can be demanded to 
satisfy a burden of production. 
The court placed the b~rden . of persuasion on the defend7 
ant apparently because it feared that "[i] f an employer need 
only articulate-not prove-a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legiti-
mate, reasons for hjs actions." Turner v. Texas Instruments, 
Inc., supra, at 1255 .(emphasis in original). We do not be-
lieve, however, that limit~ng the defendant's evidentiary obli-
gation to a burden of production will unduly hil)der the plain-
tiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its 
lPgitimate reasons must be r,lear and reasonably soecifi9. 
Supra, at 5-6. See Loeb v. Textro~. Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003, 
1011-1012. n. 5 (CAl 1979). This obligation arises both from 
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination aris-
ing from the prima fade case and from the requirement that 
the plaintiff be afforded "a . full and fair opportunity" to 
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the . defendant does 
not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant never-
-theless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that 
the emolovment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant 
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its expla~ 
'n,ation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any 
dvil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit 
,, 
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by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Ernployment Opportunity 
Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint: 
See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., - U. S. ___:.:. 
{ 1981). Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the 
plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a prof-
fered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We 
remain confident that the jlfcDonnell Douglas framework 
permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate inten-
tional discrimination. 
B 
The Court of Appe~ls ttlso erred in requiring the defendant 
to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or 
promoted was more qualified than the pJaintiff. M cDonneli 
Douglas teaches that it is the piaintiff's task to demonstrate 
that similarly situated empioyees were not treated equally, 
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeais' rule would require 
the employer to show that the plaintiff's objective qualifi: 
cations were inferior to those of the person selected. If 
it cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has 
I 
discriminated. 
. The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error. 
Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based 
upon race, sex and national origin. "The broad, overridin§ 
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is e~7 
cient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair 
and ... neutral employment and-.plilrsonnel decisions." Me-:: 
Donnel Douglas, supra, at 801. Title VII,. however, does not 
demand that an employer give preferential treatment to mi-
norities or women. 42 U. S. C. §.2000e- 2 (j). See Steel-: 
workers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 (1979). The stat .. 
ute was not intended to "diminish traditional management 
prerogatives." !d., at· 207. It does not require the employer 
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the num;r 
ber·of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Co: 
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The views of the Court of Appeals can be read, we think, a~ 
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female appli: 
cant whenever that person's objective qualifications were 
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does 
not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather
1 
the employer has discretion to choose among equally quali-
fied candidates, provided the decision is not based upon un-
lawful criteria . . The fact that a court may think that the 
employer misjudged the qu~iifications of the applicants does 
not in itself expose him to Title VII_ hability, although this 
may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pre-
texts for discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., supra, at 
1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2 
1980). 
IV 
In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the 
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the 
existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the 
respondent and that the person retained in her stead had 
superior objective qualifications for the position.12 When the 
plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
defendant bears only the . burden of explaining clearly th~ 
nondiscriminatory _reasons for its actions. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is . vacated and the c~se is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
12 Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal standard to the 
evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it erred in not review-
ing the District Court's finding of no intentiopal discrimination under 
the "clearly erroneous'' standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a). 
Addressing this issue in this case would be inappropriate because the 
District Court made no findings on the intermediate questions posed by 
McDonneU Douglas. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
J;u.prttttt <!fllltri ttl t4t 'Jhlttb J;tatts 
._asfringht~ !1. <!f. 20'p~~ 
February 20, 1981 
RE: 79-1764 - Texas Dept. of Community 
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Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~ . . 
T.M. 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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No. 79-1764 Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine 
~-~o/..(A__ 
This case -i s here on certiorari to the .~al 
A 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
It involves the proper evidenti~ burden,/ born by 
an employer,;'in a discrimination suit brought under Title 
VI~f the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The Court of Appeals hel~hat when a discharged 
employ~ proves a prima facie case of discrimination,~the 
employ.:E then must prove } by a preponderence of the 
evidencjl- that n~ndiscriminatory reasons existed. The 
Court further hel~t the employ![ also must prov~hat 
the person retained in the position-at issue~as better 
qualified than the rejected employee. -
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among 
the circuit;Jas to the appropriate burden of proof;{o rebut 
a prima fac1e case of discrimination. 
Our prior cases have held that the employer's -
burden~is to identify clearly - by evidence - a legitimate,; 
nondiscriminatory reason/ for the employment decision. This 
is merely a burden of going forward with evidence. The 
overall burden of persuasion;femains with the plaintiff 
employee. 
we think that the Court of Appeals misunderstood 
our prior rulings, ;'nd imposed an inappropriate burden of 
proof on the employer. Accordingly, its judgment is .... 
vacated, / and the case remanded for the application of the 
I 
correct legal standard. 
Peter: Were there any concurring opinions? 
2. 
LFP/lab 3/2/81 
No. 79-1764 Texas De~t. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine 
This case is here on certiorari to the Federal 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
It involves the proper evidentiary burden, born by 
an employer, in a discrimination suit brought under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The Court of Appeals held that when a discharged 
employee proves a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
employer then must prove - by a preponderence of the 
evidence - that nondiscriminatory reasons existed. The 
Court further held that the employer also must prove that 
the person retained in the position at issue was better 
qualified than the rejected employee. 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among 
the circuits as to the appropriate burden of proof to rebut 
a prima facie case of discrimination. 
Our prior cases have held that the employer's 
burden is to identify clearly - by evidence - a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. This 
is merely a burden of going forward with evidence. The 
overall burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff 
employee. 
We think that the Court of Appeals misunderstood 
our prior rulings, and imposed an inappropriate burden of 
proof on the employer. Accordingly, its judgment is 
vacated, and the case remanded for the application of the 
correct legal standard. 
Peter: were there any concurring opinions? 
l . 
2. 
March 4, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE 
Cases held for No. 79-1764, Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine 
No. 80-276, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. vaughn 
The issue in this case is whether CAB erred in 
requiring an employer, in order to rebut a prima facie case 
of discrimination, to prove by a preponderence of the 
evidence that a legitimate reason for the rejection of the 
plaintiff existed. 
Petr, a black female, was disqualified from being 
a sealtex operator at reap's plant. It is uncontested that 
she established a prima facie case of discrimination. Petr's 
supervisor testified that he disqualified petr because of 
her low productivity and poor work. The DC held this 
explanation insufficient to rebut the prima facie case 
because reap had no objective standards by which to evaluate 
productivity or quality of work. 
CAO (Stephenson, Heaney: Gibson, dissented) 
affirmed. Examining the relevent precedents the court stated 
that the employer need only articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employment action and need not 
prove absence of discriminatory intent. The court stated: 
"Therefore, while the burden of persuasion 
for demonstrating discrimination remains with 
the employee, the burden of producing 
evidence of a legitimate reason lor the 
employment practice shifts to the employer. 
The employer bears the burden of proving ~ 
rrettnderence of the evidence that the 
eg timate reason exists factually.• 
(emphasis added). 
In support of this principle, the court cited Turner v. 
Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1977), the 
case relied on by CAS In Burdine. 
'\' ... )/'' 
• 
2. 
Applying this standard to the employer's 
explanation in this case, the court agreed with the DC that 
the assertion that the employee had a poor performance 
record was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case 
because the employer lacked •objective production criteria.• 
It concluded that the employer •failed to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of its articulated reason by a preponderence.• 
The CA's decision conflicts with Burdine. I will 
vote to GVR. 
No. 80-278, Munson v. Womack 
The issue here is whether an employer's 
explanation for a discharge is either legally unacceptable 
or pretextual. 
Petr, who is a state prosecutor, hired resp as an 
investigator. Resp filed a Title VII suit against his former 
employer, the county sheriff, alleging that the sheriff 
fired resp because of race discrimination and that the 
sheriff required black officers to abuse physically black 
suspects. Petr immediately called resp into his office and 
questioned him about the charges. Resp allegedly admitted 
abusing black suspects. Petr investigated resp's charges, 
found no corroboration, and fired resp. 
Petr brought suit alleging that he had been fired 
in retaliation for bringing a Title VII suit against the 
sheriff. It is uncontested that he established a prima facie 
case. Petr testified that resp was fired because of his 
statement that he had abused black suspects. If the 
statement was true, resp was unfit to be an investigator, if 
the statement was false, resp was untruthful and unfit to be 
an investigator. Petr denied having ever stated that he had 
abused black suspects. The DC held that petr's explanation 
had rebutted the prima facie case and that it had not been 
shown to be pretextual. 
CAB (Lay, Bright, McMillian) reversed. It held 
that resp's explanation was legally insufficient to rebut 
the prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, because, even 
if resp had made the disputed statement, it had been 
extracted during an improper examination about the substance 
of resp's Title VII suit against the sheriff. The court 
ruled that even if the explanation was legally acceptable, 
the DC's ruling that it was not pretextual was clearly 
erroneous. 
3. 
Burdine has little bearing on either ruling by the 
CA. Whether the employer's explanation is legitimate and 
non-discriminatory is a different question from whether he 
has introduced enough evidence to articulate it. Also, the 
question whether an explanation is pretextual involves a 
later stage of the McDonnell Douglas test. Here, the CA 
simply found that the employee had carried his burden of 
showing that the explanantion was pretextual. 
Aside from the Burdine issue, the case seems 
sufficiently unusual and too factual to merit review. I will 
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